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APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES
IN COLLISIONS AT SEA
The United States Supreme Court recently in United States v. Reli-
able Transfer Co.' abrogated the longstanding equal division of
damages rule in cases of mutual-fault collisions at sea and adopted
the apportionment of damages rule by which damages are awarded on
the basis of the relative fault of each vessel. Equal division of damages
has been criticized by courts and commentators for its unfairness in
,cases where the contributory fault of the respective vessels is consider-
ably unequal.2 Recognizing the unfairness of the rule, courts have
avoided its arbitrary application by developing several exceptions to
the rule.3
Although the equal division of damages rule was judicially created,
the courts demonstrated reluctance to initiate a change and the United
States Supreme Court, until recently, declined to review the doctrine.
1. 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975).
2. Judge Learned Hand, dissenting in National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United States,
183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1950), denounced the rule vehemently:
I do not mean that I should divide the damages equally, if I were free to divide
them proportionately to the relative fault of the vessels. An equal division in this
case would be plainly unjust; they ought to be divided in some such proportion as
five to one. And so they could be but for our obstinate cleaving to the ancient rule
which has been abrogated by nearly all civilized nations. Indeed the doctrine that a
court should not look too jealously at the navigation of one vessel, when the faults
of the other are glaring, is in the nature of a sop to Cerberus. It is no doubt better
than nothing; but it is inadequate to reach the heart of the matter, and constitutes a
constant temptation to courts to avoid a decision on the merits. Nevertheless, so
long as our antiquated doctrine prevails, I think that we should apply it unflinch-
ingly, and in the case at bar I would divide the damages.
The "sop" to which Judge Hand refers is the major-minor fault rule, see Part
I-C-1 infra, which prompted the majority in National Bulk Carriers to ignore
the relatively minor fault of the one vessel on the grounds that the fault of the other
vessel was glaring. See also Dwyer Oil Transfer Co. v. The Edna M. Matton, 255 F.2d
380 (2d Cir. 1958).
Other commentators condemning the rule include G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 528-31 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK];
Jackson, The Archaic Rule of Dividing Damages in Marine Collisions, 19 ALA. L. REV.
263 (1966); Allbritton, Division of Damages in Admiralty-a Rising Tide of Confu-
sion, 2 J. MARITIME L. 323 (1971); Huger, The Proportional Damage Rule in Collisions
at Sea, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 531 (1928).
3. These doctrines are discussed in Part I-C infra.
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Legislative proposals for change were considered on two occasions by
congressional committees,4 but were not presented on the floor.
The Supreme Court has on several occasions considered arguments
for adoption of the apportionment of damages rule. In Weyerhauser
Steamship Co. v. United States,5 however, the Court declined to alter
the equal division of damages rule which has "for more than 100
years . . . governed . . the correlative rights and duties of two ship-
owners which have been involved in a collision in which both were
at fault." 6 In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,7
the Court, in deciding whether the rule of contribution between joint
maritime tortfeasors should be applied in noncollision cases, held that
"it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new judicial rules of contri-
bution and that the solution to this problem should await congres-
sional action."8 The Court surprised the maritime bar by granting cer-
tiorari in Union Oil Co. v. The San Jacinto9 to consider the validity of
the equal division of damages rule. But the Court avoided the issue by
creating a new "escape doctrine" and found one vessel free from
fault. 10 San Jacinto dealt what was believed to be a mortal blow to
any hope that the Court might adopt the apportionment of damages
rule, a blow which appeared all the more conclusive two weeks later
when the Court denied certiorari in The Flying Foam v. Iron Ore
Transport Co." The latter case provided a better vehicle for review of
the equal division of damages rule than San Jacinto because the fault
of both vessels was conceded; the only issue was whether damages
must be divided equally in cases of unequal fault.12
4. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text infra.
5. 372 U.S. 597 (1963).
6. Id. at 603.
7. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
8. Id. at 284-85. Commentators interpreted Halcyon as ending hopes that the
Court would change its own rule without action by Congress. See, e.g., GILNIORE &
BLACK, supra note 2, at 531.
The Court strongly indicated in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). that it would not
review its own rules after years of acquiescence to those rules by Congress. Flood in-
volved an antitrust action brought to test the legality of professional baseball's reserve
clause.
9. 409 U.S. 140 (1972); .see note 50 and accompanying text infra.
10. See Part I-C-2 infra. The avoidance of the issue after the surprising grant of
certiorari can probably be attributed to changes in the Court's membership after the
grant of certiorari.
11. 409 U.S. 1038(1972).
12. Certiorari was also denied recently in Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R. v.
Wasson dba Wasson Towing Co.. 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
The Supreme Court has never ruled that, in cases of unequal fault, damages must be
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It was against this backdrop that the Court granted certiorari to
review the issue in Reliable Transfer.13 Although the case involved the
stranding of a vessel rather than collision, the validity of the equal di-
vision of damages rule in a case of unequal fault was presented, and
Justice Stewart, writing for an unanimous court, stated:14
We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their
fault to cause property damage in a maritime collision or stranding,
liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties propor-
tionately to the comparative degree of their fault, and that liability for
such damages is to be allocated equally only when the parties are
equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure the com-
parative degree of their fault.
This comment will consider the problems which must be faced by
the courts and the bar in establishing standards for apportionment of
blame and will evaluate the effects of the new rule on other rules and
doctrines of substantive maritime law. Although the Court's decision
in Reliable Transfer abrogates the equal division of damages rule, it
leaves undisturbed several anomalous doctrines developed in response
to the rule.
divided equally, dictum in The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302, 313 (1896), notwithstanding. In fact,
in The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890), a noncollision case, the Court stated:
[C] ourts of admiralty are in the habit of giving or withholding damages upon
enlarged principles of justice and equity . . . . In the admiralty, the award of
damages always rests in the sound discretion of the court, under all circum-
stances.
Id. at 13, quoting The Mariana Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 17 (1826) and The Pal-
myra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). In The Mary Ida, 20 F. 741 (S.D. Ala. 1884),
damages actually were apportioned according to the unequal fault of the two vessels.
Nonetheless, lower courts felt compelled in the past to apply the rule even in cases of
unequal fault. Dissatisfied with the inequities of the divided damages rule, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals had directed a 75 percent-25 percent apportionment of
damages in The Margaret, 30 F.2d 923 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 862 (1929), but,
on reargument, decided to retreat and held that, whatever its own views might be, it was
"constrained" by the uniform decisions of the Supreme Court to divide the damages
equally. Id. at 923.
13. 419 U.S. 1018 (1974). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed an
equal division of damages between the United States and the owner of the tanker Mary
A. Whalen even though the trial court found the grounding of the tanker was caused 25
percent by the negligence of the Coast Guard for its failure to properly maintain a
breakwater light and 75 percent by the negligence of the tanker in making a U-turn in a
dangerous channel when its master knew the breakwater light was not working. Reliable
Transfer Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1974). The validity of the equal
division rule was the basis of the only question certified for review. 43 U.S.L.W. 3288
(1974).
14. 95 S. Ct. at 1715.
935
Washington Law Review
I. THE EQUAL DIVISION OF DAMAGES RULE
A. History of the Rule
The equal division of damages rule had mention in codes dated as
early as the 12th century.15 The English courts first applied the rule in
1647,16 and equally divided damages in all cases of unintentional col-
lision through the 18th century. Application of the rule was restricted
by Sir William Scott, later Lord Stowell, in 181517 to those cases of
collision caused by the fault of both ships. Lord Stowell's famous
dictum divided collisions into four classes: 18 (1) those involving solely
the negligence of the defendant vessel, in which case the defendant
must make good damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) those involving
negligence of the plaintiff vessel only, in which case the plaintiff vessel
bears its own loss; (3) those caused by fault on the part of both ships,
in which case the total damages are to be divided equally, the vessel
suffering the least damage to indemnify the other vessel for one-half
the difference between their respective damages; and (4) collisions
occurring without fault of either ship, in which case Lord Stowell
would have overruled the precedents that division of damages applied
to collisions without fault and to cases where it was impossible to es-
tablish the cause, in favor of a rule whereby the owner of each vessel
in such cases must bear its own loss.
Lord Stowell's four cases were referred to in dictum by the United
States Supreme Court in 1843.19 American courts, however, equivo-
cated on division of damages in cases of mutual fault until 1854 when
15. The history of the rule of division of damages is extensively treated by Justice
Stewart in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975). See also 4
MARSDEN, BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS, COLLISIONS AT SEA 95-115 (1Ith ed. 1961) [herein-
after cited as MARSDEN]; Gormley, Tile Development of the Rhodian-Roman Mari-
time Law to 1681, With Special Emphasis on the Problem of Collision, 3 INTERAM.
L. REV. 317 (1961).
The early codes arbitrarily provided for assignment of damages in specified situa-
tions, categorizing liability by the circumstances of collision rather than by inquiring
into "fault" of the vessels. Generally, they equally divided damages in some situations.
assessed one vessel for all damages in others and denied remedy to either vessel in the
remaining cases. See generally MARSDEN, supra at 95-97.
16. Huger, supra note 2. at 535.
17. The Woodrop-Sims, 165 Eng. Rep. 1422, 1423 (H.L. 1815).
18. See Strout v. Foster (The Louisville), 42 U.S. (1 How.) 89, 92 (1843), in which
the Court cites the dictum. The House of Lords adopted Lord Stowell's dictum in 1824.
Hay v. LeNeve, 2 Shaw's Sc. App. Cas. 395 (1824).
19. The Louisville, 42 U.S. (I How.) 89 (1843). The Supreme Court, in dictum of its
own, adopted Lord Stowell's dictum in cases of "inscrutable fault," cases in which nei-
ther vessel can prove the fault of the other, stating: "Where there is reasonable doubt as
to which party is to blame, the loss must be sustained by the party on whom it has
936
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the Supreme Court applied the rule in The Schooner Catharine v.
Dickinson:20
[T] he question . . .has never until now come distinctly before this
court for decision. The rule that prevails in the district and circuit
courts... is to divide the loss .... This seems now to be the well-set-
tled rule in the English admiralty .... Under the circumstances usu-
ally attending these disasters, we think the rule dividing the loss the
most just and equitable, and as best tending to induce care and vigi-
lance on both sides, in the navigation.
B. Its Substance and Application
The Supreme Court explained the mechanics of the equal division
of damages rule in The Sapphire:21
[W] here both vessels are in fault the sums representing the damage
sustained by each must be added together and the aggregate divided
between the two. This is in effect deducting the lesser from the greater
and dividing the remainder. But this rule is applicable only where it
appears that both vessels have been injured. If one in fault has sus-
tained no injury, it is liable for half the damages sustained by the
other, though that other was also in fault.
The inequitable effect of equal division of damages in cases of une-
qual fault was augmented by The Pennsylvania, in which the Court
held:22
fallen." Lockwood v. The Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 196, 203 (1869). The legal
importance of this dictum has not been tested, and several courts have limited its appli-
cation to cases where the collision might reasonably have occurred without fault of ei-
ther vessel, dividing damages equally where it was reasonably certain that one or more
vessels was at fault though neither could sustain the burden of proving the fauli of the
other. See, e.g., The Comet, 6 Fed. Cas. 195, 199.(N.D.N.Y. 1870), rev'd on other
grounds, 6 Fed. Cas. 200 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1872). Contra, The Jumna, 149 F. 171 (2d
Cir. 1906); The Banner, 225 F. 433 (S.D. Ala. 1915).
20. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177 (1854). The Court earlier applied the dictum in
cases of inevitable accidents, those occurring without negligence or fault of either party,
placing on each party its own loss. Stainback v. Rae, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 532 (1853).
21. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 51, 56 (1873).
22. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136 (1873). The heavy burden of proving that a statutory
fault could not have contributed to the collision has been met in relatively few cases.
Most of the successful arguments have involved violations of Rule 29 of the Interna-
tional Rules of the Road, 33 U.S.C.. § 1091 (1970) (which requires the keeping of a
proper lookout), where it was shown that a proper lookout could not have prevented the
collision since information that could have been provided by a lookout was otherwise
obtained. See J. GRIFFIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OI COLLISiON § 203 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as GRIFFIN].
The vitality of the rule of The Pennsylvania may be threatened by the "reasonable
expectancy rule" developed in Union Oil Co. v. The San Jacinto, 409 U.S. 140 (1972),
discussed in Part I--C-2 infra.
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[W] hen ... a ship at the time of a collision is in actual violation of a
statutory rule intended to prevent collisions, it is no more than a rea-
sonable presumption that the fault, if not the sole cause, was at least a
contributory cause of the disaster. In such a case the burden rests upon
the ship of showing not merely that [its] fault might not have been
one of the causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not
have been. Such a rule is necessary to enforce obedience to the man-
date of the statute.
The Pennsylvania Rule, i.e., that a ship in violation of a statutory duty
is presumed to be a cause of the disaster, renders a vessel otherwise
free of fault liable for one-half of the total damages because it com-
mitted a relatively minor violation of one of the International Rules of
the Road (International Rules), 23 irrespective of the degree of culpa-
bility. Because of the complexity of the International Rules and the
necessary vagueness of the General Prudential Rule24 and the Rule of
Good Seamanship, 25 a statutory violation on the part of both vessels
can be alleged in good faith in nearly every collision.
To illustrate the mechanics of the equal division of damages rule
and its potential inequities, assume two vessels, A and B, approaching
on intersecting courses on the open seas. By international convention,
A is obligated to yield right of way to B, 26 and B is required to hold its
course and speed until it is apparent that the action of A alone would
not be sufficient to avoid collision.27 The navigators of A are inatten-
23. The International Rules of the Road, promulgated by the International Confer-
ence for the Safety of Life at Sea, London, 1960, and adopted by virtually all maritime
nations, see GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2. at 489, are codified in 33 U.S.C. §§
1061-94 (1970). Similar rules apply to the inland waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C.
§ 151-232 (1970) (the Inland Rules), the Great Lakes. 33 U.S.C. 99 241-99 (1970).
and the Western Rivers. 33 U.S.C. §§ 301-56 (1970). The Inland Rules and Interna-
tional Rules are substantially similar and parallel by number: e.g., Article 27 of the In-
land Rules corresponds to Rule 27 of the International Rules.
24. Rule 27, 33 U.S.C. § 1089 (1970), provides:
In obeying and construing sections 1061 to 1094 of this title due regard shall be
had to all dangers of navigation and collision, and to any special circumstances.
including the limitations of the craft involved, which may render a departure from
such sections necessary in order to avoid immediate danger.
25. Rule 29, id. § 1091, incorporates good seamanship:
Nothing in sections 1061 to 1094 of this title shall exonerate any vessel, or the
owner, master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to carry
lights or signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper look-out, or of the neglect
of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen.
or by the special circumstances of the case.
For similar rules for the Great Lakes, Inland Waters and Western Rivers, see id. 99
292, 293,212, 221,350, 351.
26. See Rule 19, id.§ 1081.
27. See Rule 21, id. § 1083.
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tive and fail to observe the presence of B. B properly holds course and
speed until it is apparent that A is taking no action and finally B alters
its course to keep free of A. Shortly thereafter, the watch officer of A
becomes aware of B's presence and, in the excitement and confusion
of the emergency, orders an ill-conceived maneuver which frustrates
the actions of B. The ensuing collision results in minor damage to B,
but causes costly damage to A. The fault of A is obvious, but B failed
to signal its course change with proper whistle signals 28 and it is al-
leged that such signal might have shaken the officers of A from their
reveries in time to have permitted the exercise of better judgment.
B's repairs cost $100,000, and A's $3,000,000. Cargo owners, in
separate actions, obtain judgments against A for cargo aboard B
which suffered $2,000,000 damage. In an action against B, under the
apportionment of damages rule applicable in most maritime nations,
A must prove that the technical fault of B contributed to the collision
or A is liable for all losses. If A can sustain such proof, A and B will
each be liable in proportion to their fault, e.g., 90 percent and 10 per-
cent respectfully. B then would be liable to A for 10 percent of $3,-
100,000, or $310,000, less its own cost of repairs ($100,000), and, by
international convention,29 would enjoy benefits of contractual excul-
pation from liability for damages to its own cargo. A would bear a
loss of $4,390,000, including liability for 90 percent of the damage to
cargo aboard B. Under the former American rule of equal division
of damages, however, each vessel would be assessed one-half of the
total loss of $5,100,000, or $2,550,000 each. B would be liable to A
in the amount of $2,550,000, less B's cost of repairs ($100,000) even
though A was much more at fault.
American courts, legislators and commentators, 30 objecting to the
inequity of the equal division of damages rule in cases of unequal
fault, have argued for adoption of the more equitable apportionment
of damages rule. In 1939, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations found that "the change which would be brought
about by the [adoption of the apportionment of damages rule] is ob-
28. See Rule 28, id. § 1090.
29. International Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (the Hague Rules). For
the text of the Hague Rules, see A. KNAUTH, OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 40 et seq. (4th ed.
1953). For an excellent discussion of the Hague Rules, see generally T. CARVER,
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA (12th ed. 1971).
30. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2. at 529-30. See also Jackson, supra note 2,
at 266-72.
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viously an equitable one and preferable to the present arbitrary Amer-
ican rule."31 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Algren v. Red
Star Towing & Transportation Co., stated:32
The admiralty rule of evenly-divided damages in cases of injury to
property-although a highly desirable departure from the "harsh"
common-law doctrine which denies all relief to one suing for negli-
gence if guilty of contributory negligence-has frequently received
criticism as unfair. On that ground, virtually every country but ours
has abandoned it.
In 1937, 26 of 28 federal court judges polled by the United States
Shipping Board favored adoption of the apportion of damages rule in
place of the equal division of damages rule.33
Nonetheless, the equal division of damages rule continued to pre-
vail in the United States. American courts, concerned with the unfair-
ness and inflexibility of the rule in cases of unequal fault, developed
various doctrines to avoid its arbitrary application.
C. The Escape Doctrines
1. The major-minor fault doctrine
The equal division of damages rule assessed an equal proportion
of the total damages to each vessel at fault in causing the collision. If
fault of either vessel was alleged and proven, generally for such vessel
to escape liability it had the burden of proving that its fault did not
contribute to the collision. But where the degree of the negligence of
one vessel was "gross" in relation to the negligence of the other, some
courts required the grossly-at-fault vessel to prove that the negligence
of the other vessel also contributed to the collision.34 The "major-minor
31. Report of Lewis Schwellenbach, chairman of the subcommittee conducting
hearings on adoption of the Brussels Convention of 1910, in Maritime Collisions Con-
vention, 1939 A.M.C. 1051, 1052. See also note 33 and accompanying text infra.
32. 214 F.2d 618, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1954). See also N.M. Patterson & Sons. Ltd. v.
City of Chicago, 209 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. I11. 1962), rei'd on other grounds, 324 F.2d
254 (7th Cir. 1963) (normal product of the equal division of damages rule has been
"manifest injustice").
33. Sen. Exec. Rep. No. 4, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 85-88 (1939) [hereinafter cited as
Exec. Rep. No. 4].
34. See, e.g., The Victory & The Plymothian. 168 U.S. 410 (1897); Carr v. Hermosa
Amusement Corp., Ltd., 137 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1943); The Newburgh, 130 F.-321 (2d
Cir. 1904). In The Victory, the Court held:
As between these vessels, the fault of the Victory being obvious and inexcusable.
940
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fault" rule was developed by the Supreme Court in The Great Re-
public3 5 as a doctrine excusing the minor offender if the negligence of
the other vessel alone was sufficient to cause the collision. The rule was
restated as a negative presumption in The City of New York:36
Where fault on the part of one vessel is established by uncontradicted
testimony, and such fault is, of itself, sufficient to account for the dis-
aster, it is not enough for such vessel to raise a doubt with regard to
the management of the other vessel. There is some presumption at
least adverse to its claim, and any reasonable doubt with regard to the
propriety of the conduct of such other vessel should be resolved in its
favor.
Lower courts have applied the doctrine both as a rule of negative
presumption and as a means of excusing minor fault where the fault
of the other vessel is gross,3 7 but there has been little agreement as to
the legal standards to be applied. Where the lesser negligence was in
violation of a statutory duty, however, the presumption favoring the
less culpable vessel did not overcome the presumption of causation
established by The Pennsylvania, that a vessel in violation of statutory
duty at the time of the collision caused the collision. 38 In such cases
each vessel is deemed equally liable. 39 Frequently, each vessel in a
collision technically violated statutory duties; hence, the possible ap-
plication of the major-minor fault rule made the outcome of cases
involving greatly unequal fault uncertain.4 0
the evidence to establish fault on the part of the Plymothian must be clear and
convincing in order to make a case for apportionment. The burden of proof is
upon each vessel to establish fault on the part of the other.
168 U.S. at 423.
35. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 20 (1874).
This omission [to give a whistle signal] was a fault, but this fault bears so little
proportion to the many faults of the Republic, that we do not think, under the
circumstances, the Cleona should share the consequences of this collision with
the Republic.
Id. at 35.
36. 147 U.S. 72, 85 (1893).
37. See, e.g., Compania de Maderas v. The Queenston Heights, 220 F.2d 120 (5th
Cir. 1955); General Seafoods Corp. v. J.S. Packard Dredging Co., 120 F.2d 117 (Ist
Cir. 1941); Pure Oil Co. v. Jack Neilson, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. La. 1955), aff'd
233 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1956).
38. See, e.g., O/Y Finlayson-forssa A/B v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 259 F.2d 11
(5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 882 (1959). See also notes 22-23 and accompa-
nying text supra.
39. See, e.g., Diesel Tanker F. A. Verdon, Inc. v. Stakeboat No. 2, 340 F.2d 465
(2d Cir. 1965).
40. See, e.g., Partenreederei M.S. Bernd Leonhardt v. United States, 393 F.2d 756
941
Washington Law Review
2. The reasonable expectancy exception
In Union Oil Co. v. The San Jacinto,41 the tugboat San Jacinto and
the tanker Santa Maria were headed in opposite directions on oppo-
site sides of a 500-foot-wide river channel. The San Jacinto emerged
from a fogbank located on its side of the channel while making a to-
tally unexpected U-turn; the tug captain had mistakenly anticipated
an imminent collision. The San Jacinto successfully completed its U-
turn but the Santa Maria was unable to stop before the barge in tow
crashed into the port bow of the Santa Maria. The trial court found
the San Jacinto and its barge totally at fault.42 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the Santa Maria had violated a
statutory rule of the road and had not overcome the Pennsylvania
Rule's presuroption of fault. The court directed the district court to
determine the amount of damage sustained by the barge and assess
damages according to the equal division of damages rule.43
Although it granted certiorari in San Jacinto principally to review
the claim that the equal division of damages rule should be aban-
doned,44 the Supreme Court instead developed another exception to
the rule: the reasonable expectancy exception. The Court found that
although the tanker Santa Maria may have violated the rule that every
vessel in fog must proceed at a "moderate speed," 45 it was not at fault
in causing the collision if a reasonable navigator would not have an-
ticipated that another vessel would be on an intersecting course. 46 The
(4th Cir. 1968). See alo Avondale Marine Ways. Inc. v. The Crescent Cities. 184 F.
Supp. 773. 775 (E.D. La.), ajfd per curiam 287 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1960) (-[AIppli-
cation of the major-minor fault rule has become a popular pastime in this circuit so
that proof of mutual fault does not automatically lead to divided damages.").
41. 409 U.S. 140(1972).
42. Union Oil Co. v. Tugboat San Jacinto. 304 F. Supp. 519 (D. Ore. 1969).
43. 451 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1972).
44. See note 50 infira.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 192 (1970):
Every vessel shall in a fog, mist. fallingsnow, or heavy rainstorms, go at a moderate
speed, having careful regard to the existing circumstances and conditions.
A steam vessel hearing, apparently forward of her beam, the fog signal of a vessel
the position of which is not ascertained shall, so far as the circumstances of the case
admit, stop herengines. and then navigate with caution until dangerof collision is over.
"Moderate speed" has been judicially defined as speed such as "would enable [a ship)
to come to a standstill, by reversing her engines at full speed. before she should col-
lide with a vessel which she should see through the fog." The Nacoochee. 137 U.S.
330. 339 (1890). See also GRIFFIN. ,supra note 22. at 225.
46. The majority opinion interpreted the half-distance rule as requiring a reasonable
expectation of danger:
Implicit in the rule. however, is the assumption that vessels can reasonably be ex-
942
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Court had previously developed a well-recognized interpretation of
the phrase "moderate speed." This interpretation, commonly referred
to as the "half-distance" rule, provides that a reasonable speed for a
vessel is "such as would enable her [the vessel] to stop within half the
distance separating the ships when they first sight each other." 47 The
Court concluded that the half-distance definition of moderate speed
should be given effect only if the "danger against which that rule was
designed to protect," i.e., the presence of vessels whose positions are
not ascertained, is related to the collision. In San Jacinto, although
there was patchy fog, the Santa Maria was able to determine both vis-
ually and by radar that the river was clear of traffic but for the tug
and its tow, the positions and course of which were ascertained. 48
The Court's decision in San Jacinto appears to contradict or at least
ignore the presumption of liability of a vessel in violation of a statu-
tory duty established in The Pennsylvania and relied on by the Ninth
Circuit court in San Jacinto. The apparent conflict between the two
cases can be resolved, however. The statutory moderate-speed-in-fog
rule is designed to protect against collisions in fog, as is the judicially
developed half-distance rule. The Court's opinion in San Jacinto can
be regarded as finding that, under the circumstances, the speed of the
Santa Maria was "moderate," although it was in violation of the judi-
cially imposed half-distance rule. In such circumstances, the Pennsyl-
vania Rule is not applicable.
The opinion is open to criticism on at least three grounds. First, it
can be argued that the half-distance rule is designed to protect against
unanticipated course changes of vessels, as it is not uncommon that
vessels may veer due to mechanical failure or error of the helmsper-
son, or to avoid an obstruction not known to the other vessel. In this
case, the San Jacinto veered across the path of the Santa Maria due to
the error of the former's navigator; 49 the Court could have found that
the half-distance rule was designed to protect against collision re-
sulting from such an event.
Second, the opinion invites arguments that many alleged violations
of a statutory duty are merely violations of a judicially developed
pected to be traveling on intersecting courses. If, on the facts of the case, it is to-
tally unrealistic to anticipate the possibility that a vessel will travel on a particular
heading that will intersect the course of another ship, the reason for the rule is
rather clearly not present.
409 U.S. at 145.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 141.
49. Id. at 143.
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definition of the statute in issue. Many of the rules of the road are
necessarily vague and generalized, and take on meaning only through
judicial interpretation. On the basis of San Jacinto, application of the
Pennsylvania Rule can be challenged in many collision cases.
Finally, it is clear from the Court's opinion that it is reluctant to
equally divide damages in cases of substantially unequal fault and
therefore fashioned the reasonable expectancy exception in San Ja-
cinto. By doing so, the Court avoided deciding whether the equal divi-
sion of damages rule should be abandoned. 50 Rather than graft yet
another exception onto the rule, the Court should have reconsidered
the rule and adopted the apportionment of damages rule in its place as
was finally done in Reliable Transfer. Remand to apportion damages
according to the degrees of causal fault of each vessel would have
then been in order.
3. The error in extremis rule
Under the error in extremis rule, a vessel free from fault until a col-
lision is imminent may be held blameless although it erred in the eva-
sive action taken: 51
Nor do we deem it material to inquire whether the order of the cap-
tain at the moment of collision was judicious or not. He saw the
steamboat coming directly upon him; her speed not diminished; nor
any measures taken to avoid a collision. And if, in the excitement and
alarm of the moment, a different order might have been more fortun-
ate, it was the fault of the propeller to have placed him in a situation
where there was no time for thought; and she is responsible for the
consequences . . . .And if an error was committed in such circum-
stances it was not fault.
50. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated:
We granted certiorari . . .principally to consider petitioner's request that we
abandon the divided-damages rule. The orderly disposition of issues presented by
the petition for certiorari, however, requires that we address ourselves to the issue
of liability before reaching the question of damages. Since in so doing we conclude
that the Court of Appeals was wrong in holding the Santa Maria liable at all, we do
not reach the issue of damages.
Id. at 141.
Justice Stewart, the sole dissenter, would have found that the Santa Maria had vio-
lated the half-distance of visibility rule for vessels in fog (see, e.g., The Nacoochee, 137
U.S. 330 (1899)) and "would [have reached] the question which we granted certiorari in
this case to consider-the continued validity of the divided-damages rule." 409 U.S. at
150.
51. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 461 (1851).
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Although affirmative action in an in extremis situation is required by
statute,52 courts have been reluctant to impose a high standard of care
in such a situation, finding that the duty is satisfied when any reason-
able affirmative action, even if ill-advised, is taken.53
The Pennsylvania Rule54 has only limited application to in extremis
situations, as International Rule of the Road 27 requires departures
from the steering and sailing rules55 when necessary to avoid imme-
diate danger. But when violations of the rules requiring whistle signals
to indicate changes of course56 are alleged, the Pennsylvania Rule
places the burden on the vessel in violation to prove that its statutory
breach could not have contributed to the collision even though the
vessel is in extremis.57
4. The last clear chance doctrine
The last clear chance doctrine, designed to overcome the rule that
contributory negligence bars recovery, is applied when a vessel in-
volved in a collision was put in a perilous position as a result of its
own negligence, but a collision could have been averted by the exer-
cise of ordinary care on the part of the other vessel.58 The doctrine
has been limited in admiralty to cases where the first vessel's negli-
52. 33-U.S.C. §1083 (1970):
Where by any of sections 1061 to 1094 of this title one of two vessels is to keep
out of the way, the other shall keep her course and speed. When, from any cause, the
latter vessel finds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by the action of
the giving-way vessel alone, she also shall take such action as will best aid to avert
collision (see section 1089 and 1091 of this title).
53. See, e.g., The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 204 (1895) (" I he judgment of a compe-
tent sailor in extremis cannot be impugned."); Maroceano Compania Naviera S.A. v.
S.S. Verdi, 438 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971).
54. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
55. Rules 17-27, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1079-89 (1970). See also 33 U.S.C. §§ 201-12,
281-93, 342-50, for parallel Inland Waters, Great Lakes and Western Rivers rules.
56. Rule 28,33 U.S.C. § 1090 (1970). See also 33 U.S.C. §§203,213,288 (1970).
57. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
58. In Boy Andrew v. St. Rognvald, [1948] A.C. 140, 149 (1947), Viscount Simone
quoted the Law Reform Committee, Eighth Report, Cmd. No. 6032, at 16 (1939):
In truth there is no such rule-the question, as in all questions of liability for a tor-
tious act, is, not who had the last opportunity of avoiding the mischief, but whose
act caused the wrong?
The last clear chance doctrine is fully developed in Note, Last Clear Chance in Admi-
ralty, 10 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 286 (1959). The rule had its origins in Davies v. Mann,
152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842). In that case, the plaintiff negligently permitted his hob-
bled donkey to wander onto the highway. The defendant approaching in his carriage at
an excessive rate of speed was found to have been negligent in not avoiding collision
with the donkey after he had observed its helpless condition.
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gence has ceased and the vessel is passively helpless at the time of the
collision. The later fault of the other vessel must be the immediate and
predominating cause of the collision.59
Judicial development of the last clear chance doctrine and the other
escape doctrines indicate the courts' recognition that the equal divi-
sion of damages is too harsh and does not produce equitable results.
But rather than develop more, and perpetuate the current exceptions
to the rule, the courts should have long ago abandoned the rule and its
escape doctrines and adopted the more equitable apportionment of
damages rule. Abandonment of the equal division of damages rule
eliminates any need or justification for application of the escape doc-
trines. 10
II. APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES: THE BRUSSELS
CONVENTION OF 1910
At the turn of the century, the equal division of damages rule cre-
ated such concern throughout the shipping world that representatives
from most maritime nations convened at the Brussels Convention of
1910 (Brussels Convention) to review it.61 Article 4 of the rules pro-
59. GRIFFIN, supra note 22, at 491. Some courts have held the doctrine of last clear
chance inapplicable in admiralty. See, e.g., The Norman B. Ream. 252 F. 409 (7th
Cir. 1918); Williamson v. The Carolina, 158 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.N.C. 1958). Others have
applied the doctrine to exonerate the wrongdoer. See Cooper. The Last Clear Chance
Doctrine i Applicable in Admiralty, 5 N.Y.L.F. 278 (1959); 58 MICH. L. REv. 276
(1959).
For a discussion of the reasons underlying the use of the doctrine in admiralty, see
Cenac Towing Co. v. Richmond, 265 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1959).
60. See Part IV-B infra; James, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine,
47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938). Since Britain's adoption of an apportionment of damages
rule, British courts have been disinclined to apply the doctrine in admiralty cases. For
example. in Boy Andrew v. St. Rognvald, [ 1948] A.C. 140. 149 (1947). it was held that
the doctrine of last clear chance applies only if the negligence of the first wrongdoer
"created a static condition where nothing that he could do when collision threatened
would have avoided the result" and found that the negligence of the first wrongdoer did
in fact contribute to the collision. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar
result in Cenac Towing Co. v. Richmond, 265 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1959). finding that. al-
though the last clear chance doctrine exists in admiralty. it cannot be applied where the
negligence of both parties continues to the moment of collision.
61. The purpose of the Convention is apparent from its title: International Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules to Govern the Liability of Vessels when Colli-
sions Occur Between Them, and Protocol thereto. I & 2 Geo. 5. c. 57 (1911). The offi-
cial text of the Convention is in French. Compare the translation used by the United
States Senate. Executive K. 75th Cong.. Ist Sess.. April 29. 1937. quoted in GRIFFIN.
supra note 22, at 852-57 (App. XV) [hereinafter cited as United States Translation].
For an excellent history of the Convention, see French. A New Law for the Seas, 42
L.Q. REV. 25 (1926). See also Telsey, English Apportionment of Blame in Collisions at
Sea, 15 TUL. L. REV. 567 (1941).
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posed by the Brussels Convention delineates a comparative negligence
doctrine:62
If two or more vessels are in fault the liability of each vessel shall
be in proportion to the degree of the faults respectively committed.
Provided that if, having regard to the circumstances, it is not possible
to establish the degree of the respective faults, or if it appears that
the faults are equal, the liability shall be apportioned equally.
The damages caused either to the vessels, or to their cargoes, or to
the effects or other property of the crews, passengers, or other persons
on board, shall be borne by the vessels in fault in the above propor-
tion without joint and several liability toward third parties.
Virtually all other maritime nations, 63 including England in 1911,64
have abolished the equal division of damages rule and adopted the
substance of the Brussels Convention rules.
Legislation proposing ratification of the Brussels Convention and
adoption of its rules has twice been introduced in Congress.65 Despite
favorable reports from the subcommittees, neither proposal was sub-
mitted to either house of Congress. The failure of ratification efforts
in 1939 has been attributed to opposition from cargo insurers who
feared loss of favorable treatment under the Chattahoochee Rule, 66
the disruptive influence of the events leading to World War II and a
poor translation of the Brussels Convention document which resulted
in misunderstanding regarding the Brussels Convention's effect. 67 The
6Z. Article 4 also provides that:
[1] n respect of damages caused by death or personal injury, the vessels in fault
shall be jointly as well as severally liable to third parties, without prejudice to the
right of recourse of the vessel which has paid a larger part than that which in accord-
ance with the provisions of the first paragraph of this article she ought ultimately to
bear.
It is left to the law of each country to determine, as regards such recourse, the
scope and effect of any legal or contractual provisions which limit the liability of
the owners of a vessel toward persons on board.
63. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975). For a list of signa-
tory and adhering nations, see id. at 1712 n.7.
64. Id.
65. For an account of the forces which successfully opposed ratification by the
United States, see Comment, The Difficult Quest for a Uniform Maritime Law: Failure
of the Brussels Conventions to Achieve International Agreement on Collision Liability,
Liens, and Mortgages, 64 YALE L.J. 878 (1955).
66. See Part IV-C supra.
67. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 95 S. Ct. 1708, 1714 n.14 (1975), citing
H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT 414-15 (2d ed. 1969); Staring, Con-
tribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 45 CALIF. L.
REV. 304, 343 (1957).
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1962 legislation proposing adoption of the Brussels Convention was
tied to an unpopular proposal to adopt the 1957 Brussels Convention
relating to the limitation of liability of owners of seagoing vessels. The
legislation was not presented to the Senate. 68
III. STANDARDS FOR APPORTIONMENT OF BLAME:
THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE
The difficulty of assigning relative degrees of fault to vessels is fre-
quently cited as a disadvantage of the apportionment of damages
rule.69 Apportionment of damages, however, is not unfamiliar to
American admiralty courts. The bulk of maritime litigation involves
personal injuries and death, damages for which are apportioned ac-
cording to degrees of fault.70 American courts also have apportioned
damages under conflict of laws rules in cases of collisions which oc-
curred in the territorial waters, or involved vessels, of nations which
adhere to the apportionment of damages rule. 7 ' Moreover, American
courts may draw upon the English experience in collision cases to
help in anticipating the problems and standards to be considered in
determining the "niceties" of fault.
A. English Standards for Apportionment of Damages
English courts often find either vessel wholly liable or divide dam-
68. See generally Liabilit) in Collisions Between Vessels, Hearings on S. 2313 and
S. 2314 Before the Subeomin. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). See also S. Rep. No. 1603. 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
69. See, e.g., The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1. 12 (1890). See also Nickert v. Puget
Sound Tug & Barge Co.. 335 F. Supp. 1158. 1160 (W.D. Wash. 1972). quoting G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 440 (1957):
Commentators have long expressed a preference for the doctrine of comparative
negligence over the more easily applied but often inequitable rule of equal divi-
sion of damages.
"'The only objection [to doing so] that really has any plausibility is the one
based on the difficulty of assigning degrees of fault in exact percentages. The an-
swer is . . .that judges would simply approximate as best they could, as is done
every day in other cases in matters of amounts of damages, degrees of disability.
etc. An attempt at a division on the basis of the degree of fault would at least not be
foredoomed to go badly wrong in a large number of cases. as is the present rule."
70. See Staring, supra note 67, at 340.
7 1. See, e.g., The Mandu, 114 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1940). See also Fitzpatrick v. Inter-
national Ry., 169 N.E. 112 (N.Y. 1929) (damages apportioned in accordance with con-
flict-of-laws rules in a nonmaritime case).
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ages equally;72 the latter outcome results from a proviso of Article 4
of the Brussels Convention which requires equal apportionment of
liability when it is not possible to establish different degrees of fault.7 3
No clear formula has emerged from the English collision cases for
determining whether different degrees of fault exist, and, if so, in what
proportion liability should be assigned.
72. See, e.g., Telsey, supra note 61, at 567. Of 64 collision cases reported in Lloyd's
Law Reports, 1964-1973 inclusive, damages were apportioned in the following
manner: one ship wholly liable, 20 cases; 415-115 liability, 3 cases; 314-1/4 liability, 4
cases; 7/10-3110 liability, 2 cases; 2/3-1/3 liability, 10 cases; 315-2/5 liability, 11
cases; 1/2-1/3-1/6 liability, I case; equal liability, 13 cases. Huger reports that in
314 collision cases reported in Lloyds List Law Reports for the years 1922-1927 inclu-
sive, damages were apportioned as follows: one ship wholly liable, 247 cases; 415-115
liability, 1 case; 315-2/5 liability, 13 cases; 2/3-1/3 liability, 13 cases; equal liability,
40 cases. Huger, supra note 2, at 547.
Comparison of these two surveys reveals two trends. First, the number of ollision
cases tried has decreased substantially over the years, most likely due to the practicing
bar's increased ability to predict results of litigation so that more out-of-court settle-
ments are reached. The second trend correlates with the first: in both surveys, a large
percentage of cases tried resulted in a decision of sole fault or liability, reflecting the
election of one party to try the case rather than accept a realistically low settlement. The
sharp decline of sole fault decisions suggests reluctance to gamble the expenses of litiga-
tion against better known odds.
73. See note 62 and accompanying text supra. The meaning of the proviso is left
unclear by conflicting decisions of the English courts. In The British Aviator, [1965] 1
Lloyd's List L.R. 271, 277 (C.A.), the court stated:
[In] plain language what the proviso means is that, whatever the ground may be for
attributing different degrees of fault, it must be a ground which is proved by cogent
evidence, and if that is not so, then the old Admiralty rule of equal division con-
tinues to prevail.
But unequal apportionment is required if, on the evidence presented, it is apparent that
the fault of the vessels was unequal, even though the precise degree of fault is not
proven:
Now that section [Art. 4], as I read it, is mandatory. It does not say that the lia-
bility shall be apportioned equally unless different degrees of fault are shown. It is
the other way round. It says that the Court must apportion the liability in propor-
tion to the degree in which each vessel was at fault unless it is impossible to do so.
The Anneliese, [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 355, 363 (C.A.).
When I look again now at that section I observe .. a perfectly clear indication
that the primary task of the Court is to apportion liability according to fault. This is
followed by the proviso that if the Court finds it not possible to apportion different
degrees of fault, the Court is to declare an equal distribution of fault. It is, there-
fore, as a matter of construction, a condition precedent to a declaration that lia-
bility be apportioned equally that the Court has found it impossible to establish dif-
ferent degrees of fault .... [T] hat is not the same thing as saying that where dif-
ferent degrees of fault cannot be established, then the liability should be equal.
The Lucile Bloomfield, [1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 341, 351 (C.A.). Thus, it is not necessary
that the exact degree of fault of the respective vessels be demonstrated, but the court
must not apportion damages equally when it appears from the evidence that the fault
was substantially unequal.
Justice Stewart anticipated this problem in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,
95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975), and makes it clear that "liability for such damages is to be allo-
cated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly
to measure the comparative degree of their fault." Id. at 1715-16.
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1. "Causation" or "degree of culpability"
Adoption of the apportionment of damages rule in the United
States raises the question whether liability should be apportioned on
a basis of "causation" of damages or on "degree of culpability." Un-
fortunately, the earlier English cases are not enlightening. The
opinion of Lord Shaw in The Clara Camus7 4 indicated that the
apportionment of "cause" is the same as apportionment of negligence,
explaining that the greater the carelessness, the more causal signifi-
cance it has. Lord Shaw's explanation is inconsistent, however, with
the court's statement in The Peter Benoit: "The Aurrera might have
been more to blame at the outset [the "degree of culpability" theory],
but the Peter Benoit was more to blame at the end [the "causation"
theory] .,,5 In that case a judgment assessing four-fifths of the dam-
ages against the Aurrera was modified to render each vessel liable for
one-half the damages.
More recent English decisions may provide guidance to American
courts; they suggest that both culpability and causation should be con-
sidered. 76
2. Statutory violations
Under an apportionment of damages rule, parties may claim that
violations of one or more statutes by one vessel are outweighed by
statutory violations of the other. For example, it may be argued that
liability should be apportioned 75 percent to a vessel violating three
statutes and 25 percent to a vessel violating only one statute; 77 or, that
there is a hierarchy of statutes and that violation of one should be as-
signed a higher degree of fault than violation of another. American
74. 136 L.T.R. (n.s.) 291 (H.L. 1926).
75. 114 L.T.R. (n.s.) 147 (H.L. 1915).
76. See, e.g., The Marimar. [ 19681 2 Lloyd's Rep. 165 (Adm.). in which the "blame-
worthiness" of one vessel was held to be double that of the other, but the fault of the
latter had greater "causative potency" in causing the collision. Damages were appor-
tioned 60 percent to the vessel of greater "blameworthiness." Cf. The British Aviator.
[1965] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 271, 277 (C.A.). where it was held that:
[I] n assessing degrees of fault regard must be had both to the blameworthiness of
the conduct alleged and also to its causative potency as a factor contributing to the
collision and damage.
77. English courts have rejected such an argument, referring to "the error of adding
up sins and assessing culpability by a kind of arithmetical process. saying that one side
has done three things wrong and the other side only done one thing wrong." The Oro-
pesa. 68 Lloyd's List L.R. 21, 27 (Adm. 1940). See notes 80-81 and accompanying text
infra.
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courts may find instructive the English courts' resistance to these at-
tacks on the International Rules of the Road, finding equal liability in
cases involving substantial statutory violations on the part of both ves-
sels.78 In later English cases, however, the courts have apportioned
damages unequally although both vessels violated one or more Inter-
national Rules, based on findings that the fault of one vessel had a
greater causal relationship to the collision than that of the other.79
In view of the policy of the Brussels Convention that liability
should be apportioned if it is possible to do so,8° equal fault should
not be assigned merely because both vessels have committed a statu-
tory violation: "Matters of this kind cannot be determined by any
mathematical formula." 8' Although violation of one rule should be
regarded as equally "blameworthy" as violation of another, to accom-
plish substantive justice courts must have the flexibility to evaluate the
causative potency of such fault in apportioning liability. 82
B. The Use of Nautical Assessors or Special Masters
Recognizing that special expertise may be required for proper adju-
dication of degrees of fault in seamanship, England uses nautical as-
sessors to assist the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in admi-
ralty cases in understanding the factual circumstances of a collision.83
A trial court may also call on an assessor to determine facts relative to
navigation and seamanship and evaluate the respective degrees of
fault, although the court is not bound by such advice.84 The assessors
are drawn from the ranks of naval officers, merchant vessel masters
78. See, e.g., The Kaiser Wilhelm II, 31 L.T.R. 615, 624-25 (C.A. 1915), in which
Lord Bankes stated:
[Tihe fault of each vessel being the breach of a statutory regulation so important to
be observed in the interests of navigation generally, it is not possible to establish
different degrees of fault.
See also Bilbaino v. Defender, 6 Lloyd's List L.R. 392 (Adm. 1921).
79. See, e.g., The Anneliese, [ 1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 355 (C.A.), in which both vessels
admitted violation of Rule 16 by failing to reduce speed upon entering a fog bank. On
appeal, however, liability was apportioned 213 and 1/3 upon a finding that the ill-advised
course change of one vessel was the most culpable and causative fault on either side.
80. See note 73 supra.
81. The Anneliese, [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 355, 362 (C.A.).
82. For a discussion of apportioning damages considering both "blameworthiness"
and "causative potency," see note 76 supra.
83. See MARSDEN, supra note 15, at 279-80 & n.70.
84. See, e.g., The Llanover, 78 Lloyd's List L.R. 461, 469 (C.A. 1945). Matters of
navigation and seamanship are considered part of the special province of nautical asses-
sors; testimony of other expert witnesses on such matters is generally not permitted.
MARSDEN, supra note 15, at 274.
951
Washington Law Review
and Elder Brothers of the Corporation of Trinity House (a pilots' as-
sociation).
An American court sitting in admiralty may, in difficult cases re-
quiring nautical expertise, call to its aid experienced mariners. 85 But
such experts are called only as witnesses; they have no function in as-
sessing the relative fault of the vessels involved. Because of the large
number of judges who may hear admiralty cases,8 6 it is desirable that
the use of experts with functions similar to the English nautical asses-
sors be encouraged in American courts. Their use would promote ju-
dicial economy by determining complicated issues in a more efficient
proceeding and serve to ensure a measure of uniformity in decisions.
American practice presently permits courts of admiralty to delegate
their factfinding functions to special trial masters or commissioners,
but only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.87
It is submitted that, under an apportionment of damages rule, the
need for uniformity in assessment of relative liability in collision cases
presents an exceptional condition which justifies liberal use of masters
or commissioners to determine the issues of relative liability.
C. Appellate Review of Apportionment
Early English courts held that the trial judge's findings of relative
degrees of blame is a conclusion of fact, reviewable by the Court of
Appeals in the same manner as any other finding of fact by a trial
85. See, e.g., The Hypodame. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 216, 224 (1867). See FED. R. EVID.
614(a). 28 U.S.C. (Supp. 1975): "-The court may. on its own motion or at the sugges-
tion of a party. call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus
called."
86. Original admiralty jurisdiction is noted in the federal district courts pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). There are approximately 385 federal district court judges.
ANNUAL REPORr OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 298 (1973).
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 53. A finding of the special master in American courts upon
questions of fact depending on conflicting testimony or the credibility of a witness is
not disturbed unless clearly erroneous. N LRB v. Standard Trouser Co., 162 F.2d 1012
(4th Cir. 1947): The Paquete Habana. 175 U.S. 677 (1899). Nonetheless. it is necessary
for the judge to review the transcript of the proceedings to determine if error has been
made and. if objection to the report has been made. the judge should determine whether
the master's report should be accepted. rejected wholly or partly modified, recommitted
with instructions or whether further evidence should be received by the court. D.M.W.
Contracting Co.. Inc. v. Stolz. 158 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1946). The court must accept the
master's findings if the report shows that he or she has performed the duties conscien-
tiously. discussed the facts clearly and applied the proper rules of law. Rundell v. Box.
89 F. Supp. 166 (D. Colo. 1948).
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judge.88 In British Fame v. MacGreagor,89 the House of Lords re-
versed the Court of Appeals decision altering the apportionment of
damages, and held that "the cases must be very exceptional indeed in
which an appellate court, while accepting the findings of fact of the
court below as to the fixing of blame, none the less [sic] has sufficient
reason to alter the allocation of the trial judge." 90 Lord Wright rea-
soned that such an apportionment is9'
[a] question, not of principle or of positive findings of fact or law, but
of proportion, of balance and relative emphasis, and of weighing dif-
ferent considerations; it involves an individual choice or discretion, as
to which there may well be differences of opinion by different minds.
Viscount Simone suggested that alteration in apportionment might be
appropriate in exceptional cases if the trial judge had misapprehended
a vital fact bearing on the matter, or there was some error in law, but
otherwise apportionment of damages is to be considered a question of
judicial discretion. 92
Limited appellate review of assessment of damages is desirable
given the adoption of the apportionment of damages rule in the
United States. The lower courts, especially if they use special masters,
would develop consistency and expertise in determining the relative
degrees of fault and in applying standards of apportionment. Limited
review is desirable to assure finality of initial judgments and en-
courage out of court settlement.
IV. THE EFFECT OF APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES
ON OTHER RULES OF MARITIME LAW
In the interests of international uniformity of law, it would have
been desirable for Congress to adopt the Brussels Convention of 1910
in its entirety, rather than for the Supreme Court to adopt the appor-
tionment of damages rule without consideration of the remaining dis-
88. See, e.g., The Testbank, 72 Lloyd's List L.R. 6 (C.A. 1942); The Clara Camus,
136 L.T.R. (n.s.) 291 (H.L. 1926).
89. [1943] 1 All E.R. 33 (H.L.). See 59 L.Q. REV. 102 (1943), which suggests that
British Fame "may prove to be the most important case decided by the House of Lords
during the past year."
90. [194311 All E.R. at 34.
91. Id.at35.
92. Id. at 34.
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crepancies between American law and that of the rest of the maritime
world. The Court's Reliable Transfer decision leaves the validity of
the Pennsylvania Rule and the various escape doctrines in doubt, and
does not affect the anomalous doctrine of The Chattahoochee. It also
raises the question of its retroactive effect on mutual fault collisions
occurring before the date of the decision.
A. The Rule of The Pennsylvania
Consistent with the goal of worldwide uniformity of law, Article 6
of the Brussels Convention abolishes all legal presumptions of the sig-
natory nations.93 This goal of uniformity recommends abrogation of
the Pennsylvania Rule as a substantive rule of law. 94 Under the appor-
tionment of damages rule, courts will continue to consider statutory
violations and their role in causing a collision. Statutory violations
will thus be relevant in apportioning damages, but they will no longer
create a substantive presumption of sole liability. At most, the Penn-
sylvania Rule will retain a procedural effect: When a statutory breach
on the part of one vessel is proved, the burden shifts to that vessel to
prove that its negligence was not the sole cause of the collision; it
must establish its relative degree of fault.
B. The Escape Doctrines
Apportionment of damages according to degree of fault eliminates
the need for doctrines developed to ameliorate the harsh results of the
equal division of damages rule. The "major-minor fault" rule has no
application where damages are apportioned according to degree of
fault. The "reasonable expectancy" exception will lose its status as a
rule and operate merely as another factor to be considered in deter-
mining the degree of fault. 95 Similarly, the "error in extremis" rule
should become another ingredient on the issue of negligence, and
93. Paragraph 2 of Article 6 states: "There shall be no legal presumptions of fault in
regard to liability for collision." United States Translation. supra note 61. at 853.
94. For discussion of the Pennsylvania Rule, see Part I-B supra.
95. The reasonable expectancy exception might also still have some procedural ap-
plication as a defense to the Pennsylvania Rule. The Court's recent decision in Union
Oil Co. v. The San Jacinto, 409 U.S. 140 (1972). suggests that in a reasonable expec-
tancy situation, a vessel may comply with statutory obligations, yet violate the general
judicial interpretation of that obligation. In such a case, the Pennsylvania Rule is not
applicable. See Part I-C-2 supra.
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should not be used as a substantive "escape device." 96 Finally, adop-
tion of the apportionment of damages rule should remove any tempta-
tion to strain the last clear chance doctrine to avoid an inequitable
result.
C. The Rule of The Chattahoochee
Under the American rules of liability, each vessel in a mutual fault
collision is jointly and severally liable, with right of contribution, for
damages incurred by innocent third parties.97 Thus, the owner of
cargo that is damaged in such a collision can recover full damages
from the non-carrying vessel, and the latter is then entitled, under the
equal division of damages rule, to contribution from the carrying
vessel for one-half the damages. This indirect liability of cargo
carrying vessels to cargo owners was upheld in The Chattahoochee98
even though it circumvents the right of the carrying vessel to disclaim
liability for errors in navigation and management of the vessel, as
permitted by the Harter Act99 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA).100
Adherence to the Brussels Convention rules would eliminate the
Chattahoochee Rule since Article 4 abrogates joint and several lia-
96. The English law retains a similar rule: When one vessel by a wrongful act sud-
denly puts another in extremis, the evasive action of the latter need not meet the general
standard of competency. See, e.g., The Bywell Castle, [1878] 4 P.D. 219 (C.A.); The
Bretagne, 7 Lloyd's List L.R. 127 (Adm. 1921). In the same situation, some courts have
held simply that a mere mistake in judgment by the other vessel is held not to have
caused the collision. See, e.g., The Nor, 30 L.T.R. (n.s.) 576 (P.C. 1874); The Fager-
strand, 33 Lloyd's List L.R. 67 (Adm. 1929).
97. See, e.g., Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, 417 U.S. 106 (1974); The Chatta-
hoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
98. 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
To avoid application of the Chattahoochee Rule, it has been to the carrying ship's
pecuniary advantage in cases where damages to its own cargo amount to more than 50
percent of the total damages to argue that the other vessel was not at fault in causing the
collision; with no mutual fault, the Rule does not apply and the carrying ship and owner
escape liability to cargo owners under the Harter Act and COGSA.
Compare Article 4 of the Brussels Convention, quoted in text accompanying note 62
supra.
99. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1970). Section 192 provides:
If the owner of any vessel. . . shall exercise due diligence to make the said vessel
in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped, and supplied, neither the
vessel, her owner or owners, agent, or charterers, shall become or be, held respon-
sible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or in the man-
agement of said vessel. . ..
100. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970).
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bility to third parties for cargo damage.101 The direct liability of the
carrying vessel to cargo owners would remain limited by the provi-
sions of the Harter Act and COGSA.10 2 Although the Chattahoochee
Rule is applied by American courts to vessels irrespective of their na-
tionality,10 3 a much higher percentage of American vessels are subject
to actions in United States courts than are vessels of foreign registry
because American flag vessels are more likely to be involved in colli-
sions in the territorial waters of the United States due to the geog-
raphy of their operations, and are exposed to actions in the admiralty
courts of the United States in the case of collision on the high seas.104
The United States shipowner is at a disadvantage, as cargo underwrit-
ers may bring subrogated actions against American shipowners in
United States courts when it is to the underwriters' advantage,
whereas a foreign shipowner is less frequently subject to application of
the American law. 105
Although it discriminates against American flag shipowners, the
Chattahoochee Rule has not provided a corresponding benefit to the
shippers of cargo. No reduction of rates of cargo insurance is made
for shipment in American bottoms.' 06 That the American exporters do
101. See text accompanying note 62 supra. Article 4 recognized joint and several
liability of the respective vessels, with recourse, but expressly recognized the effect of
contractual limitations of liability of the carrying vessel. See note 62 supra. See text
accompanying note 29 supra for an example of computation of damages under the
Brussels Convention. Under the new American rule, the noncarrying vessel will be lia-
ble for 100% of cargo damages, but can seek contribution from the carrying vessel for
the latter's proportional share of such liability.
102. See notes 99-100 supra.
103. American courts do not apply the Chattahoochee Rule in collisions where both
vessels are registered under the flags of nations adhering to the Brussels Convention and
the collision occurs outside the territorial waters of the United States. Cf. Ishizaki Kisen
Co.. Ltd. v. United States. 510 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1975). in which the choice of law
rules of American admiralty courts were discussed. The court appears to have rejected
a strict "locality rule" to determine which substantive rules should apply and. with re-
spect to whether the Pennsylvania Rule should apply, chose the law of the nation which
had "the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties." Id. at 879. In
a collision on the high seas. the nations of the flags of the vessels would have the only
substantial relationship to the occurrence and the parties. The "most significant relation-
ship" rule is the subject of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (197 1).
104. Most American flagships call frequently at American ports and are subject to
actions in rem wherever they may be found. American shipowners are subject to the
personal jurisdiction of United States courts and actions can be commenced against
them in personam whenever application of American substantive law appears advanta-
geous.
105. The owners of foreign flag vessels are, in most cases, foreign corporations not
subject to the personal jurisdiction of United States courts; thus, in rem jurisdiction over
foreign flag vessels can be avoided by not calling at United States ports.
106. See Hearings on S. 2313 and S. 2314 Before the Subcommn. on the Merchant
Marine and Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 87th Cong.. 2d Sess. 39
(1962).
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not utilize the possible advantage afforded by the rule is highly ap-
parent in the fact that they shipped but 5.8 percent of their total ex-
ports in American bottoms in 1972.107 The Supreme Court should
reconsider the Chattahoochee Rule; it contravenes the intent of Con-
gress and in no way serves public policy.' 08
D. Retroactive Effect
The Supreme Court has in many cases expressed its views as to the
retroactive effect of decisions announcing new rules.109 The Court has
recognized its power to grant or deny retroactive effect to such rules,
indicating that the relevant criteria for deciding the issue of retroac-
tivity in a particular case are:110 (1) the purpose to be served by a par-
ticular new rule; (2) the extent of reliance which has been placed upon
the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new rule.
To determine the retroactive effect of the apportionment of dam-
ages rule, it is necessary to evaluate each of the three relevant criteria.
Various decisions have indicated that in determining the retroactivity
of a new rule, the foremost, though not necessarily the controlling,
criterion is the purpose of the rule."' The purpose of the apportion-
ment of damages rule is clear: to achieve a more "just and equitable"
allocation of damages than is possible under the equal division rule."12
It is equally clear that such purpose can best be achieved by applying
107. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 584 (95th ed. 1974). By compari-
son, in 1950 U.S. flag vessels carried 43.7 per cent of imports and 32.5 percent of ex-
ports, by tonnage. In 1972, U.S. flag vessels carried only 4.5 percent of imports. Id.
108. The subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended
elimination of the anomaly of the Chattahoochee Rule to "make the law of the United
States uniform with the rest of the world." Maritime Collisions Convention, 1939
A.M.C. 1051, 1056. For various reasons, Congress has been reluctant to legislate in this
area of judicially imposed admiralty rules. The Supreme Court has indicated that it has
responsibility and authority to reconsider its admiralty doctrines; see note 13 and ac-
companying text supra, and should reconsider this antiquated and discriminatory rule.
The Supreme Court recently prepared the way for eliminating the Chattahoochee
Rule in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, 417 U.S. 106 (1974), in which the Court
stated that admiralty recognizes the right of contribution between joint tortfeasors ex-
cept when the tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought is immune from tort lia-
bility by statute.
109. See generally Annot., 22 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1970).
110. See, e.g., Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
I11. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
112. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 95 S. Ct. 1708 (1975).
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the rule to all cases of unequal fault, regardless of the date of collision
relative to the date of promulgation of the new rule.
The second criterion is of little relevance in evaluating the retroac-
tive effect of the apportionment rule. It would be difficult for a party
to allege in good faith or successfully argue that it became involved in
a collision only because of reliance on the equal division of damages
rule and that retroactive application of the new rule would defeat such
reliance.
Assuming the first two criteria suggest retroactive application of the
new rule, it must be decided to which cases such application is appro-
priate: those not yet to trial; those in which a judgment has been ren-
dered but is appealable; and those in which judgment has become
final. Application of the new rule will have no substantial effect on
administration of justice as far as cases which have not yet gone to
trial, regardless of the date of collision, except for the possible in-
crease in the number of cases which may be litigated. 113 The rule
should not have application to cases in which judgment has become
final, i.e., those no longer subject to ordinary methods of review. The
Supreme Court has indicated that retroactivity as to final judgments
will be recognized only if the overruling decision is deemed so signifi-
cant or fundamental as to defeat the purposes underlying the doctrine
of res judicata. 114 The Court's decision in Reliable Transfer clearly is
not so significant or fundamental.
The remaining question is the effect of the new rule on cases which
nad been tried but had not yet become final at the time of the Court's
decision in Reliable Transfer. Because counsel have not presented a
case of apportionment, it will be necessary to retry the cases on this
issue. Nonetheless, the burden of retrying these cases should be min-
imal and the new rule should be applied.
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial adoption of the apportionment of damages rule is a large
step toward insuring substantive justice in maritime collisions caused
113. Justice Stewart expressed the opinion that the apportionment rule would re-
duce litigation on the rationale that previously a party only slightly at fault had incen-
tive to litigate the controversy in hope of being absolved of all responsibility under the
major-minor fault rule and added that, even if such were not the case, - [C] ongestion
in the courts cannot justify a legal rule that produces unjust results in litigation simply
to encourage speedy out-of-court accommodations.'" Id. at 1714.
114. Linkletter v. Walker. 381 U.S. 614 (1965).
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by mutual but unequal fault. It eliminates the largest inconsistency
between the collision law of the United States and the rest of the mari-
time world. Elimination of the inequities of the equal division of dam-
ages rule and of the'uncertain doctrines now used by courts to amelio-
rate its harshness is a proper role for the Supreme Court. But United
States v. Reliable Transfer Co. did not present opportunity for review
of the Chattahoochee or the Pennsylvania Rules, doctrines which
must be changed to secure the uniformity of laws necessary for well-
ordered international commerce. Because of the judicial adoption of
the apportionment rule of damages, it is doubtful that Congress will
find it necessary to adopt the Brussels Convention of 1910 or other-
wise review these anomalous doctrines.115 Thus, the Court should be
receptive to other opportunities to bring American admiralty law into
step with the rest of the world.
Charles M. Davis*
115. In the interests of uniformity of law and predictability of results, Congress
should also consider adoption of a statute of limitations which conforms to that of other
maritime nations. No statute of limitations presently applies to traditional admiralty
actions; American courts apply the doctrine of laches to bar recovery in cases involving
unreasonable delay in commencing the action if the defendant can demonstrate preju-
dice by such delay. See, e.g., Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 30 (1951).
Article 7 of the Convention provides that actions for damages due to collision must
be commenced within two years after the date of damage, provided that a court may, in
accordance with its rules, extend the period to such extent and on such terms as it deems
fit, and that the signatory nations may legislatively extend the period as necessary to
provide plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to arrest the defendant vessel within the juris-
diction of the court. See United States Translation, supra note 61. Adoption of a rigid
statute of limitations without such a proviso would contravene the general equitable
principles of the traditional laches rule. See Gardner v. Panama R.R., supra.
If Congress fails to adopt a statute of limitations, the goal of uniformity may be
served by a judicially developed presumption of inexcusable delay and prejudice to the
defendant after two years. That period could be derived from the period deemed reason-
able by the general maritime law of the world.
* Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n; B.S., 1966, United States Merchant Marine
Academy; J.D., 1973, University of Washington.
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